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Research Effect of incentives on insecticide-treated bed net 
use in sub-Saharan Africa: a cluster randomized 
trial in Madagascar
Paul J Krezanoski*1, Alison B Comfort2 and Davidson H Hamer3,4,5
Abstract
Background: Insecticide-treated bed nets (ITNs) have been shown to reduce morbidity and mortality due to malaria in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Strategies using incentives to increase ITN use could be more efficient than traditional distribution 
campaigns. To date, behavioural incentives have been studied mostly in developed countries. No study has yet looked 
at the effect of incentives on the use of ITNs. Reported here are the results of a cluster randomized controlled trial 
testing household-level incentives for ITN use following a free ITN distribution campaign in Madagascar.
Methods: The study took place from July 2007 until February 2008. Twenty-one villages were randomized to either 
intervention or control clusters. Households in both clusters received a coupon redeemable for one ITN. After one 
month, intervention households received a bonus for ITN use, determined by visual confirmation of a mounted ITN. 
Data were collected at baseline, one month and six months. Both unadjusted and adjusted results, using cluster 
specific methods, are presented.
Results: At baseline, 8.5% of households owned an ITN and 6% were observed to have a net mounted over a bed in 
the household. At one month, there were no differences in ownership between the intervention and control groups 
(99.5% vs. 99.4%), but net use was substantially higher in the intervention group (99% vs. 78%), with an adjusted risk 
ratio of 1.24 (95% CI: 1.10 to 1.40; p < 0.001). After six months, net ownership had decreased in the intervention 
compared to the control group (96.7% vs. 99.7%), with an adjusted risk ratio of 0.97 (p < 0.01). There was no difference 
between the groups in terms of ITN use at six months; however, intervention households were more likely to use a net 
that they owned (96% vs. 90%; p < 0.001).
Conclusions: Household-level incentives have the potential to significantly increase the use of ITNs in target 
households in the immediate-term, but, over time, the use of ITNs is similar to households that did not receive 
incentives. Providing incentives for behaviour change is a promising tool that can complement traditional ITN 
distribution programmes and improve the effectiveness of ITN programmes in protecting vulnerable populations, 
especially in the short-term.
Background
Insecticide-treated bed nets (ITNs) have been demon-
strated to be of significant value in reducing morbidity
and mortality due to malaria in sub-Saharan Africa[1,2].
Despite their accepted effectiveness, there remain barri-
ers to the use of ITNs in vulnerable households, including
both supply- and demand-side constraints, which make
rapid scale-up of ITN coverage difficult to achieve. On
the demand-side, much attention has been paid to the
need for subsidization of the cost of ITNs as a means to
increase ITN coverage, because cost has been identified
as an important barrier to ITN ownership[3,4].
Once households acquire an ITN, there are still signifi-
cant questions about the determinants of actual use[5,6].
R e p o r t s  o f  m i s u s e  o f  s u b s i d i z e d  n e t s  c o m p l i c a t e  t h e
efforts of government and non-governmental organiza-
tion (NGO) malaria prevention programmes seeking to
promote ITN coverage and use in poor countries[7,8].
Various studies have demonstrated that providing nets
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for free is important to overcome the cost barriers associ-
ated with obtaining an ITN [9,10], but mere provision of
free ITNs may not be enough to provide coverage for the
required 80% of households that the WHO has indicated
is necessary to provide community-wide "mass" protec-
tion from malaria[11-13].
Interventions to increase the actual use of ITNs have
focused on subsidizing the costs associated with net own-
ership and providing education about malaria transmis-
sion and prevention. There are other tools which could be
used to promote healthy behaviours, however, given evi-
dence of the effectiveness of performance-based incen-
tives in encouraging healthy behaviours such as weight
loss and tobacco cessation[14,15]. Only in recent years
have performance-based incentives been more widely
applied to the promotion of behaviours related to health
problems in developing countries[16], such as childhood
immunizations[17], nutrition[18], maternal care[19] and
tuberculosis detection and treatment[20].
To date, there have been relatively few randomized con-
trolled trials looking at the effects of incentives on health
behaviours in poor countries and no study has yet looked
at the effect of incentives on the use of ITNs. Given the
challenge of achieving high coverage rates of ITNs, even
after their free distribution, reported here are the results
of a village-clustered randomized controlled trial which
provided household-level incentives in order to stimulate
ITN use following a free bed net distribution campaign in
Madagascar.
Methods
Study site and population
The study took place in rural villages located around the
town of Ambalavao in the Ambalavao district of Mada-
gascar. This location was chosen because of previous
relationships with local partners developed by two of the
authors (PJK and ABC) during service in the Peace Corps
from 2003 to 2005. Madagascar is among the poorest
countries in the world, with 85% of the population living
below the poverty line, defined as $2 a day[21]. The
Ambalavao district (population of 210,000; 5,000 km2) is
comprised of the large town of Ambalavao (population of
30,000) in addition to scores of rural villages ranging
from ten to seventy households clustered around land
used for rice farming and cattle grazing.
The inhabitants of these rural villages belong primarily
to the Betsileo ethnic group. There are 18 ethnic groups
in Madagascar, organized roughly into two groups: the
central highland peoples with their Indonesian and Asian
origins and the more traditionally African origin of the
coastal people. The Betsileo are of the former group,
making up roughly 12% of the population of Madagascar.
They have a strong rural tradition of rice farming, build-
ing terraces along the slopes of the steep hills of the cen-
tral highlands[22].
The district of Ambalavao is located in a valley abutting
the eastern tropical forest in the south central part of the
country, with an average elevation of 800 metres descend-
ing from the central highlands to the southern plateau.
The study was carried out during six months from July
2007 until February 2008, beginning just after the rice-
harvesting season, continuing through the dry season and
finishing in the rainy season.
Malaria in Madagascar
Like the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, malaria is a public
health challenge for the country of Madagascar. Malaria
accounts for 16% of all outpatient visits in Madagascar. It
is the leading cause of child mortality and the second
leading cause of death for all age groups. Malaria kills
nearly 20,000 children a year under five years of age and
accounts for 11% of all deaths and 15% of years of life lost
[23,24]. The entire country is considered to be at risk for
endemic malaria, while some areas of the central high-
lands are vulnerable to epidemics with seasonal transmis-
sion from September to June. All four species of malaria
parasite are endemic in Madagascar with the majority of
infections caused by Plasmodium falciparum and
approximately 10% caused by Plasmodium vivax and
other species[25]. In 2007, with the support of the Global
Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the country's
National Malaria Control Programme put into place a
five year plan with the goal of providing free ITNs for all
pregnant women and children under five years of age.
However, based on 2003-2006 estimates, only 35% of chil-
dren under five in Madagascar were sleeping under a bed
net of some kind and no children were sleeping under
ITNs[26].
Malaria characteristics of Ambalavao district
With an average elevation below 1,000 meters and aver-
age temperatures of 20°C, malaria transmission in the
Ambalavao district is considered to be stable year round.
A comparison of presumed monthly malaria cases to
annual cases shows that the majority of transmission
occurs during the rainy season from January to April. The
primary vectors are Anopheles funestus and  Anopheles
arabiensis with Plasmodium falciparum as the primary
parasite[27].
In 2002, one out of every five health care visits in the
Ambalavao district was for presumed malaria[21]. Much
of the baseline malaria characteristics of the Ambalavao
district must be estimated from statistics at the provincial
level. A study conducted in 2004 found that, in the Fian-
arantsoa province, which includes the district of Ambala-
vao, 11% of children under five years of age reported a
fever in the previous two weeks[28]. While data on ITN
use in the Ambalavao district are not available, in 2008,
34% of households in the Fianarantsoa province owned a
net and 30% of children under five years of age and 34% ofKrezanoski et al. Malaria Journal 2010, 9:186
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pregnant women reported sleeping under a net the night
before.
Randomization procedures
The study was conducted in twenty-one villages located
within five kilometers of the central town of Ambalavao.
The study participants included each household in the
study villages. Randomization was performed at the vil-
lage level, with each village representing a cluster. This
cluster design was used to increase acceptability of the
intervention and decrease potential programme backlash
by study participants if some households living in a vil-
l a g e  r e c e i v e d  b o n u s e s  w h i l e  o t h e r s  d i d  n o t.  I n i t i a l l y ,  a
total of eighty villages were identified within five kilome-
ters of Ambalavao using a local map, with twenty villages
coming from each of the four quadrants according to
their location relative to Ambalavao (i.e. northeast,
northwest, southeast and southwest). The villages were
listed alphabetically by quadrant and numbered sequen-
tially from 1 to 80. This listing by quadrant ensured a rea-
sonably balanced sampling of villages from all four
quadrants. A random number was then chosen by a
t h r o w  o f  d i c e .  T w e n t y - o n e  v i l l a g e s  w e r e  t h e n  s e l e c t e d
from the list of eighty by counting off the names of the
villages using the random number and looping back
through the list until all 21 villages were chosen. The
names of the villages were then written on slips of paper
and drawn randomly from a hat. The first eleven villages
drawn were allocated to the control group and the next
ten were allocated to the intervention group.
Study procedures
Surveyor training
A team of 15 health workers was hired to undertake vil-
lage outreach and perform the study surveys. The health
workers were members of two Malagasy non-govern-
mental associations, Association Fanilo and Association
Avotra, a men's and women's association respectively.
These two organizations were created with the assistance
of two of the authors (PJK and ABC) during their time as
Peace Corps Volunteers in Ambalavao from 2003 to 2005.
In 2002, John Snow International (JSI) developed a net-
work of health workers throughout Madagascar, and
many of the health workers had received training as part
of this effort. The health workers had received additional
training during their work with the authors from 2003 to
2005, and also during their work on a previous ITN study
based in Ambalavao in 2004. This previous ITN study
was performed in different villages from the current
study. For the current study, the surveyors received a full
day of training which included a description of the study,
a module on ethics and obtaining informed consent from
study subjects, a review of the survey instruments and
practical experience performing the surveys on two test
subjects.
Protocol visit
Following the training, health workers were then dis-
patched to each village for a "protocol visit" where the
project was introduced to the local village leader. This
visit also allowed the surveyors to arrange for a conve-
nient time to return to the village when at least one adult
member of each household would be available for the
baseline survey.
Baseline survey and coupon distribution
Following the initial protocol visit, the survey teams were
s e n t  t o  p e r f o r m  t h e  b a s e l i n e  s u r v e y  a n d  e n r o l l  s t u d y
households. A "household" was defined as a family unit or
individuals living separately from any other family unit or
individuals (i.e. living spaces could not be contiguous).
Criteria for inclusion in the study encompassed all house-
holds located within one of the study villages. House-
holds who had no member present during the baseline
survey were able to enroll during the net distribution
week, if a village leader could attest to their residence in
the study village. There were only three households who
took advantage of this enrollment option. At the baseline
encounter, each household was surveyed on demographic
characteristics, household assets, perceptions of risk
related to malaria and baseline ITN ownership and use.
In addition to asking whether a net was used the night
before, surveyors also entered each household and
assessed visually whether or not a net was mounted over
a bed. In this study, because of potential inconsistencies
from self-reported net use, the mounting of a net over a
bed is used as a proxy for net use and will be referred to
interchangeably. Households were unaware of when the
survey personnel would arrive to inspect the household.
In the survey questions about bed net ownership and use,
no distinction was made between insecticide-treated and
untreated bed nets. This does not change the underlying
assumption that bed net coverage is insecticide-treated
bed net coverage, because the only bed nets on the mar-
ket in the Ambalavao area during this time were ITNs. In
addition, all of the households who reported bed net
ownership at the baseline survey reported obtaining their
nets through ITN distribution programmes at local
health clinics or through community-based health educa-
tors who are provided by government programmes with
ITNs for resale. At the baseline encounter, each house-
hold was also given a coupon redeemable for one free
ITN and instructions on how to redeem the coupon.
Additionally, in the intervention villages, the households
were informed that they would receive a bonus if they
were using their nets when the survey team returned at
some random time in the coming month. The value and
form of the bonus was not disclosed at that time; instead,
the households were informed that they would receive a
"prize" for correct use of the free ITNs.Krezanoski et al. Malaria Journal 2010, 9:186
http://www.malariajournal.com/content/9/1/186
Page 4 of 13
ITN description
The ITNs used in the study were obtained through Popu-
lation Services International (PSI), the primary provider
of ITNs in the region. The ITNs were white and rectangu-
lar shaped Permanet brand (Vestergaard-Frandsen, Den-
mark) long-lasting insecticide-impregnated nets (LLINs)
made of polyester. The dimensions were 150 × 180 × 190
cm. These LLINs are expected to last up to three years or
twenty-one washings. The ITNs were packaged in plastic
along with string and instructions in the local language
explaining how to mount the net over a bed.
ITN distribution
The coupons distributed at the baseline survey were
redeemable in the central town of Ambalavao. In the
interest of convenience for study participants, ITN distri-
bution was begun on the local market day when many vil-
lagers typically come to Ambalavao. In addition to the
instructions given during the baseline survey, radio
announcements were made and signs were created to
direct the study participants to the location where they
could redeem their coupons. The ITN distribution site
was on a major road off the town center located in an
empty lot between some shops. The study team sat with
the ITNs under a covered area and a queue was created.
Coupon holders were required to hand over one coupon
in exchange for one ITN. There was no limit on the num-
ber of coupons an individual could redeem. Following the
exchange, the coupon number was registered and the
coupon was destroyed. Nearly all of the ITNs (~95%)
were distributed on the initial market day, but coupons
were honoured for the next week.
One month surveys and bonus distribution
One month after the baseline survey, survey teams
returned to all households for the one month follow-up
surveys. Households were asked whether they owned a
net and were using the net. The surveyors then visually
inspected whether an ITN was mounted over a bed. In
the intervention villages, households who had correctly
mounted an ITN over a bed were given the bonus. The
bonus consisted of 2,000 ariary (approximately $1) worth
of household goods packaged in a plastic bag: coffee,
sugar, salt, soap and rice.
Six month surveys
In order to determine the medium term use of nets and to
try to capture seasonal differences in use patterns, the
survey teams returned to all households at six months
following the intervention to perform the final follow-up
survey. At this encounter, households were again sur-
veyed on perceptions of risk related to malaria, net own-
ership and net use. Surveyors performed visual
inspections of sleeping areas to determine actual use of
ITNs. The goal of the study was to stimulate early uptake
and use of the ITNs with a one-time provision of incen-
tives at the one-month visit, so no bonuses were prom-
ised at the one-month encounter for nets mounted at six
months and no bonuses were provided at the six-month
visit.
Statistical analysis
Study endpoints
The primary outcomes were household ITN ownership
and use one month following net distribution. The sec-
ondary outcomes were ITN ownership and use at six
months following net distribution.
Power calculation
It was hypothesized that at one month post-intervention,
70% of households in the intervention villages would use
their ITNs in comparison to 30% of the households living
in the control villages. Initially, a two-armed study was
envisioned, including 24 villages, with 12 villages in each
arm, a 1:1 allocation of intervention to control villages,
about 22 households per village and a total study popula-
tion of 530 households. The unit of analysis in the study
was at the household level within each village, meaning
that sample size calculations were required to take into
account possible correlation between the households in a
village. Since information was not available on the intrac-
luster coefficient (ICC) for the outcomes in this study, a
rather large ICC of 0.25 was assumed. Based upon these
assumptions, the study would need to include at least
nine villages per arm with four households per village to
have 80% power to show a difference in ITN use of 40%
between the treatment and control groups.
Data management and analysis
Surveys were monitored on returning from the field for
completeness and accuracy and surveyors were sent back
to the field if data were missing. The collected data were
then entered by members of the study team into Epi Info
3 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta,
Georgia) using a predefined template. Consistency of the
data was ensured by random checks matching paper sur-
veys to entered data. The data were cleaned following the
completion of data entry and a master data set was cre-
ated in Stata 10 (Statacorp, College Rd, TX) for analysis.
Description of t-tests and regressions
Both unadjusted and two forms of adjusted results are
presented. These three sets of results represent three lev-
els of adjustment for confounding variables. The crude
and unadjusted results include comparisons of propor-
tions of ITN ownership and use in the intervention and
control groups at the baseline, one-month and six-month
surveys. All adjusted results use cluster specific methods
to account for randomization of households at the village
(cluster) level as recommended in the latest CONSORT
statement on the best practices for reporting the results
of cluster randomized trials[29]. The first set of adjusted
results from cluster-adjusted t-tests includes ICC coeffi-
cients and adjusted chi-squared values for the outcomesKrezanoski et al. Malaria Journal 2010, 9:186
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of interest. The second set of adjusted results is from a
modified Poisson regression model, using a robust error
variance, which is used to estimate risk ratios and p-val-
ues[30]. These regression results estimate the effects of
the intervention while controlling for household and vil-
lage level potential confounders such as household demo-
graphics, number of children under five years of age,
n u m be r  o f  p r e gn a n t  w o m e n ,  h o us e h o l d  as s ets  s u c h  as
cell phones and cattle, cooking fuel type, home composi-
tion, number of rooms, number of beds, distance from
water source, reported fevers in the previous month,
reported deaths due to fever in the previous year, previ-
ous ITN ownership and use, village size and village loca-
tion. A p-value of less than 0.05 was considered to be
significant for all tests.
Ethical clearance
Ethical clearance for the study was provided by the Bos-
ton University Medical Campus Institutional Review
Board. Additional administrative approval was provided
by the mayor of the town of Ambalavao, responsible for
the villages in the district, and the Medicin Inspecteur of
the Ambalavao health district, the local official in charge
of all health-related activities in the district. Additionally,
the chiefs of each village gave their approval for the study
to take place in their village. Study participants provided
verbal consent at the time of the surveys and coupons for
t h e  f r e e  I T N s  w e r e  p r o v i d e d  t o  a l l  h o u s e h o l d s  i n  t h e
study villages irrespective of whether or not they con-
sented to participate in the study.
Results
Participant flow
In July 2007, 21 villages were randomized to either the
intervention or control arm of the study (Figure 1). This
resulted in 10 clusters with 237 households in the inter-
vention arm and 11 clusters with 349 households in the
control arm, making a total of 586 participating house-
holds. Only 21 villages, rather than the planned 24, were
randomized due to logistical convenience. This lower
number was deemed acceptable because the mean num-
ber of households per village (~34) was substantially
higher than what was required according to the power
c a l c u l a t i o n  ( ~ 2 2 ) .  B y  t h e  t i m e  o f  d a t a  a n a l y s i s ,  i t  w a s
observed that the data from one village included informa-
tion for only one household and the original surveys were
mistakenly destroyed. This village was excluded from the
analysis, reducing the intervention arm to 9 clusters vs.
11 clusters for the control arm. The overall loss to follow
up rate was similar for both arms over the six-month
study (10% in the intervention group vs. 12% in the con-
trol group).
Baseline characteristics
A summary of the baseline characteristics of the study
households shows that the households had a mean of five
household members of which 53% were females (Table 1).
Sixty-one percent of households had at least one child
under five years old and 5% had a pregnant woman resid-
ing there. The majority of households had a home con-
structed of mud bricks (99%), a dirt floor (90%) and a
thatch roof (78%). Sixty-five percent of households used
an open water source for their daily water needs, a sign of
lower socio-economic status and a potential source of
increased risk of malaria infection. The households were
an average of 9 minutes walk from their water source. At
baseline, about 8% of households owned an ITN and
about 6% were observed to have a net mounted over a
bed in the household.
None of the village, household or malaria prevention
characteristics differed significantly between the inter-
vention and control groups, except for a greater propor-
tion of the intervention households reporting a
household member with a fever in the previous month
compared with the control households (42% vs. 28%, p <
0.01). At baseline, there were no differences between the
intervention and control group in the proportion of
households owning a mosquito net, nor in the proportion
with an ITN mounted over a bed in the household.
One month outcomes
Both the intervention and control groups sought and
obtained ownership of an ITN to an equal degree, with no
differences in one-month ownership between the two
groups (Table 2). There was, however, a large difference
between the two groups in terms of overall net usage,
with 99% of the intervention group versus 78% of the con-
trol group having a net mounted in their household at
one month (p < 0.001). Adjusting for the clustered design
and controlling for possible confounding factors resulted
in an adjusted risk ratio for ITN use at one month in the
intervention group of 1.24 (1.10 to 1.40; p < 0.001).
Six month outcomes
After six months, net ownership had slightly decreased in
the intervention compared to the control households
(Figure 2). Among households that had reported owning
a net at one month, 3.3% of intervention households ver-
sus 0.3% of households in the control group no longer
owned an ITN by six months (p < 0.01). This result was
confirmed after adjusting for the clustered design and
controlling for confounding factors, resulting in an
adjusted risk ratio for net ownership at six months in the
intervention group of 0.97 (0.95 to 0.99; p < 0.01).
At six months there was a decrease in net use in inter-
vention households, from 99% to 93%, and an increase inKrezanoski et al. Malaria Journal 2010, 9:186
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Figure 1 Flow diagram for clusters and participants. Diagram depicting the flow of clusters and participants in the study from participant enroll-
ment through data analysis.Krezanoski et al. Malaria Journal 2010, 9:186
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Table 1: Baseline characteristics of villages and households
Village Characteristics Intervention Control
(9 villages; n = 213) (11 villages; n = 306)
Number of households per village (mean ± SD) 34.7 ± 24.3 33.8 ± 17.3
range: 9 - 74 range: 11 - 66
Households using open water source (%) 66.2 64.1
Village distance to open water source (mins) (mean ± SD) 139 ± 7.4 13.5 ± 7.1
Household Demographic Characteristics
Number of members per household (mean ± SD) 5.2 ± 2.9 5.2 ± 2.6
range: 1 - 20 range: 1 - 16
Number of men per household (mean ± SD) 2.4 ± 1.7 2.4 ± 1.7
Number of women per household (mean ± SD) 2.7 ± 1.6 2.7 ± 1.7
Number of children under five per household (mean ± SD) 0.92 ± 0.96 0.95 ± 0.89
range: 0 - 5 range: 0 - 3
Households with at least one child under five (%) 57.7 61.4
Number of pregnant women per household (mean ± SD) 0.06 ± 0.25 0.05 ± 0.22
range: 0 - 2 range: 0 - 1
Households with at least one pregnant woman (%) 5.2 5.2
Malaria Prevention Characteristics
Baseline net ownership (%) 8.5 8.5
Baseline net use (%) 6.6 5.6
Baseline net mounted (%) 6.1 5.6
Children under five years using a net the night before (No (%)) 11/18 (61) 12/26 (46)
Pregnant women using a net the night before (No (%)) 18/18 (100) 25/26 (96)
Malaria Risk Characteristics
Households reporting member with fever in last month (%) 42.3* 28.1
Number of households reporting death last year due to fever 0 1
* p-value < 0.01
use in control households, from 78% to 89.5% (Figure 3).
Restricting the analysis to only households that owned a
net at six months, intervention households were much
more likely to use their ITN than control households
(96% versus 90%; p < 0.001).
Discussion
The primary goal of this study was to test the effects of
household-level incentives on the uptake and use of ITNs
in a rural African setting. This study provides useful
information regarding health behaviours in regards to
ITNs, an increasingly important topic in development lit-
erature as the field progresses from elucidating the barri-
ers to ownership to honing in on the factors that predict
actual ITN use. In addition, as the first study analysing
the effect of incentives on the use of ITNs in resource-
poor settings, this study helps to link theories of behav-
ioural economics to malaria prevention in developing
countries. This is an important link, because, to this
point, much of the literature about incentives for chang-
ing health behaviours has been limited to developed set-
tings.Krezanoski et al. Malaria Journal 2010, 9:186
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The main finding of this study is that provision of
incentives for the use of ITNs increases the probability of
ITN use by 24% in the immediate term. This increase in
ITN use at one month occurred even though ownership
of ITNs was essentially equivalent between the interven-
tion and control households, highlighting the importance
of looking at demand for ITN ownership and actual ITN
use as interrelated, but separate, outcomes.
E v e n t u a l  u s e  o f  I T N s  i s  a  t w o - s t e p  p r o c e s s  t h a t
involves, first, acquiring an ITN and, second, actual
mounting and daily use of that ITN. Each of these steps is
associated with barriers that stand in the way of preven-
tion programmes whose goal is to maximize widespread
use of ITNs and reduce malaria transmission. Much of
the current literature, embodied in the debate over
whether or not to distribute ITNs for free, focuses on the
first step in this process, namely, the financial costs to
households and other logistical barriers associated with
the procurement and distribution of ITNs[4,5]. Lately, it
has become clear that "closing the gap" between ITN
ownership and use, especially among vulnerable popula-
tions[31], is increasingly important. For example, in many
locales, there are differences between the local popula-
tion's perceived risk of malaria and their actual risk. This
discrepancy can result in poor adherence to ITN use dur-
ing periods of high malaria transmission[32].
The present study had as one of its goals the elimina-
tion of barriers to ITN ownership, so that the behavioural
impact of the incentive for ITN use could be isolated.
This goal was achieved through the provision of ITNs for
free to all households and the distribution of the ITNs
through a centralized location equally accessible to all
households. Since nearly 99% of both the intervention
and control households owned ITNs at one month, this
strategy was effective in getting the nets to the study
households without bias, allowing for an isolation of the
effects of the incentives on household behaviour in rela-
tion to ITN use.
Studies looking at the effect of incentives on changing
health behaviours have found that incentives are effective
in the short-term, but often fail to influence long-term
behaviour[10]. This study demonstrates a similar result,
with the intervention group decreasing its ITN use from
99% at one month to 93% by six months, presumably in
response to the removal of the incentive for use. Other
studies have shown that household motivation for use of
ITNs, even in a free distribution programme with an edu-
cation component, is dampened over time and depends
Table 2: Insecticide-treated bed net ownership and use at baseline, one month and six months
Intervention
 No. (%)
Control 
No. (%)
Intracluster correlation 
coefficient
Cluster-adjusted 
χ2 value
Adjusted risk 
ratio (95% CI)
Adjusted P value
Number of villages 9 11
Number of households 213 306
Baseline
Net Ownership 18/213 (8.5) 26/306 
(8.5)
Net Mounted 13/213 (6.0) 17/306 
(5.6)
One Month
Net Ownership 212/213 
(99.5)
304/306 
(99.4)
0.0231 0.05 1.00 (0.99 to 1.01) 0.79
Net Mounted 211/213 
(99.1)
240/306 
(78.4)
0.1894 5.23 1.24 (1.10 to 1.40) <0.001
Six Months
Net Ownership 206/213 
(96.7)
305/306 
(99.7)
-0.0007 5.26 0.97 (0.95 to 0.99) <0.01
Net Mounted 198/213 
(93.0)
274/306 
(89.5)
0.0317 0.9 1.01 (0.96 to 1.08) 0.18Krezanoski et al. Malaria Journal 2010, 9:186
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on factors such as convenience and conceptions of
malaria risk[33]. In this study, however, the control and
intervention groups moved in opposite directions over
time, as illustrated by Figure 3. While the intervention
group slightly decreased its ITN use from one to six
months, the control group greatly increased its ITN use
from 78% up to 90%.
Accounting for this increase in six-month ITN use in
the control group is easier than accounting for the
decrease, albeit small, in the intervention group. The
ITNs were originally distributed during the dry rice-har-
vesting season. When ITN use was evaluated six months
later, it was during the rainy season. Thus, the increase in
use by the control households could be due to seasonal
changes when presumably there is greater mosquito bur-
den and perceived need for ITNs. Still, since seasonal
changes should affect both control and intervention
groups equally, it is not clear why ITN use should
increase so dramatically in the control households while
slightly decreasing in the intervention households.
One possible explanation for this decrease in use in the
intervention households from one to six months could be
that the incentive artificially induced some households
which do not intrinsically value ITNs to mount their nets
at one month. By the time of the six-month survey, once
the incentive had been removed, these households were
no longer using their ITNs. The existence of even a small
proportion of these types of households, which do not
intrinsically value ITNs, could account for the evidence in
other settings showing the divergence of ITNs towards
unintended uses[8] and may play a role in the debate
regarding the potential waste of ITNs when they are pro-
vided for free to poor households.
It is interesting to note, especially from the standpoint
of behavioural economics, that inclusion in the interven-
tion group made a household that owned an ITN at one
Figure 2 Proportion of households owning an insecticide-treated bed net (ITN). Graphical depiction of the proportion of households in the con-
trol (dotted line) and intervention (solid line) groups which owned an ITN at baseline, one month and six months.
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99.5%  p<0.01 
99.4% 
96.7%   
75% 
50% 
25% 
8.5%  Intervention 
8.5% 
 
Control 
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month slightly less likely to own an ITN by six months. In
fact, this decrease in ownership among incentivized
households accounts for the bulk of the decrease in ITN
use by six months. Behavioural economics predicts that
the provision of incentives as an extrinsic source of moti-
vation for behaviours can inhibit intrinsic motivation for
use [34]. In addition, economic theory suggests that a
negative price (i.e. paying a consumer to use a good in the
form of an incentive) may provide a negative quality sig-
nal and potentially devalue the good in the view of some
consumers. In the present study, conclusions are difficult
to draw since the number of incentive households that
gave up their net is small (~3%). Economic theory
assumes that households should rationally demand pre-
ventative health goods, but our results suggest that more
research needs to be done to look at the variable effects of
incentives on valuing of these goods in poor households.
Despite the bonus' negative effect on ITN ownership
after six months in a small portion of households, the
majority of the intervention households continued to
own a net after six months, thus demonstrating that they
valued that net by using it. Although overall net use
dropped from 99% to 93% in the intervention group from
one month to six months, net use conditional on owner-
ship remained high at 96% versus 90% in the control
group. This means that intervention households that
owned a net were significantly more likely to use their net
than control households that owned a net. This may indi-
cate that the bonus for mounting a net had a lingering
effect on a household's use of a net, perhaps by creating a
barrier in terms of effort to un-mount an already
mounted ITN in some households.
These findings are consistent with past studies which
demonstrated that the size of the incentive may not be
Figure 3 Proportion of households with a mounted insecticide-treated bed net (ITN). Graphical depiction of the proportion of households in 
the control (dotted line) and intervention (solid line) groups which had an ITN mounted at baseline, one month and six months.
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correlated with an expected economic response[35,36].
In this study, the intervention households were promised
a bonus of an indeterminate amount for ITN use at one
month. The subsequent uptake and use of the ITNs in the
intervention group was over 99%. Since the incentive was
for an indeterminate amount, it appears that the mere
offer of a bonus, of any value, was enough to overcome
barriers to use. This finding is in line with previous stud-
ies of incentives which have found that the ability to over-
come the psychological barrier to behaviour change is not
necessarily proportional to the size of the incentive[10].
There are advantages and disadvantages to using incen-
tives for boosting ITN use. In terms of advantages, the
incentives themselves do not have to be of any definite
value and they can be used to quickly and definitively
cover almost an entire target group in a short amount of
time. In contrast, there are two reasons why, as a practical
matter, using incentives to boost ITN use on a larger scale
may prove problematic. First, there are personnel and
resource requirements associated with the follow-up vis-
its required for the implementation of an incentive
scheme. Secondly, incentives appear to only boost use of
ITNs for a short period of time, and so repeat incentives
may be required to sustain high level ITN use.
Despite these disadvantages, providing incentives for
the use of ITNs could be a powerful tool, especially for
programmes seeking coverage of vulnerable groups such
as children younger than five years and pregnant women.
There are a variety of methods, like social marketing and
subsidization of ITN prices, that have been used to
increase household ownership of ITNs. However, as men-
tioned previously, increasing household ownership is
only the first step in achieving wider ITN coverage.
Once ITNs have made it into the household, education
campaigns have traditionally been the tool of choice for
addressing the gaps between ownership and use of ITNs
in these groups[37]. Different types of education cam-
paigns have been utilized, including mass communica-
tion, communications targeted to specific communities,
schools, and health facilities and follow-up visits to
households[38]. These education campaigns have all
been based on the assumption that providing information
about the risks associated with malaria and the mecha-
nism of protection offered by ITNs will lead to higher
perceived value of ITNs and thus increased use of ITNs.
Education campaigns, however, may not be the most effi-
cient means of ensuring ITN coverage of priority groups.
A possibly more cost-effective approach could be to use
incentives to cover vulnerable populations during epi-
demics of malaria when malaria morbidity and mortality
are high. Incentives and free ITNs could be provided for
coverage of households with children under five or preg-
nant women. This intervention could quickly lead to the
required 80% of households that the WHO has indicated
is necessary to provide community-wide "mass" protec-
tion from malaria[11]. In addition, this targeted interven-
tion would have the benefit of definitively covering the
most vulnerable groups. Targeted approaches like the one
presented here offer the opportunity to bypass the gap
between ITN ownership and use and put direct control
over who uses ITNs in the hands of policy makers and
public health experts.
One limitation of this study is the short time period of
the intervention. The study was not powered nor
designed to look at longer term outcomes. It would be
useful to know the outcomes after one year to see if the
proportion of households using ITNs continued to con-
verge over time, or if ITN use dropped off in both groups
as is suggested by some other longitudinal studies[27].
Furthermore, this study was not designed to provide
definitive information about how the presence of children
under five years or pregnant women in the household
affects a household's likelihood of using a net.
There is some potential discrepancy between using the
observation of a mounted net over a sleeping area as an
indicator of use, since some households have been found
to not use nets in hot weather (e.g. an ITN is mounted
above a bed but is not unfurled around the bed at night).
Observed net mounting is a more reliable proxy than
relying solely on self-reported use. In addition, direct
observation of the household for a mounted net was per-
formed during household surveys, which occurred at an
unannounced time, so misleading the data collection
team would have been difficult. Night-time visits and
other methods of determining actual ITN use were not
deemed logistically feasible. Another potential issue is
that there was no distinction made between whether nets
owned at baseline were insecticide-treated or not. How-
ever, as discussed, most households in this region did not
have access to non-insecticide treated bed nets.
Conclusion
The provision of behavioural incentives to households in
rural Madagascar significantly increased the use of ITNs
after one month compared to households that did not
receive incentives. By six months, the use of ITNs con-
verged back towards a level similar to the control house-
holds. Households which received incentives for ITN use
were more likely to use an ITN that they owned after six
months than households that did not receive an incentive.
Performance-based incentives for behaviour change are a
promising tool that may improve the effectiveness of ITN
programmes, particularly in achieving immediate cover-
age of populations most vulnerable to malaria. Incentives
offer the opportunity to bypass the gap between ITN
ownership and use and put more direct control over who
uses ITNs in the hands of policy makers and public health
experts. The results of this study demonstrate the poten-Krezanoski et al. Malaria Journal 2010, 9:186
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tial of incentives to boost ITN use in the immediate term.
Further research is needed to determine the longer-term
effects of these incentives and the cost-effectiveness of
incentives versus traditional education campaigns for
boosting the use of ITNs in sub-Saharan Africa.
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